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Abstract 
Individualisation theory misrepresents and romanticises the nature of agency as a 
primarily discursive and reflexive process where people freely create their personal lives 
in an open social world divorced from tradition. But empirically we find that people 
usually make decisions about their personal lives pragmatically, bounded by 
circumstances and in connection with other people, not only relationally but also 
institutionally. This pragmatism is often non-reflexive, habitual and routinised, even 
unconscious. Agents draw on existing traditions  - styles of thinking, sanctioned social 
relationships, institutions, the presumptions of particular social groups and places, lived 
law and social norms - to ‘patch’ or ‘piece together' responses to changing situations. 
Often it is institutions that ‘do the thinking’.  People try to both conserve social energy 
and seek social legitimation in this adaption process, a process which can lead to a ‘re-
serving’ of tradition even as institutional leakage transfers meanings from past to present, 
and vice versa. But this process of bricolage will always be socially contested and 
socially uneven. In this way bricolage describes how people actually link structure and 
agency through their actions, and can provide a framework for empirical research on 
doing family. 
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Personal life, pragmatism and bricolage 
 
1 Introduction  
People usually make family decisions pragmatically with reference to their material, 
social and institutional circumstances. This pragmatism assumes some sort of power in 
making practical decisions and carrying out everyday tasks – in other words agency 
operates within constraint. Unfortunately, much of social science has a romantic view of 
agency as dominantly purposive and conscious, neglecting the practical, habitual and 
unconscious. This is evident in individualisation theory. Moreover, the structuration 
problem – how structure and agency interrelate through people’s actions - has not gone 
away. Consequently we need to develop a framework that goes beyond definitional 
notions of praxis or habitus to describe how people actually do connect structure and 
agency through their behaviour.  I take the idea of institutional bricolage as a means of 
doing this, and as a way forward in family research. In the next section I set the scene by 
illustrating how people behave pragmatically in personal life, using the examples of 
mothers’ orientation towards paid work, and less traditional family forms. Based on these 
examples, section 3 briefly revisits ideas of agency and structuration, and section 4 
develops the notion of institutional bricolage as one solution. Section 5 concludes with 
some remarks on bricolage and family research. 
 
2. People behaving pragmatically 
We know that mothers in Britain are more likely to withdraw from a worker role than 
women of a similar age who are not mothers; mothers are likely to see childcare as their 
chief role and either withdraw from employment altogether (especially if the children are 
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below school age) or work part-time around school or nursery / childminder hours.  Male 
partners, conversely, are likely to expand their ‘provider’ role in full-time work.  A few 
years ago Darren Smith and myself mapped local variations in mothers’ relative 
withdrawal from the worker role by local authority area, using 2001 census data (Duncan 
and Smith 2006). We called this the ‘motherhood employment effect’, see Figure 1 
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What we found initially surprised us. It was mothers living in higher income areas, such 
as the richer parts of the South East, who were most likely to withdraw from the worker 
role. Those mothers with apparently most room for manoeuvre (in that they can better 
afford childcare and transport costs, probably possess more human capital, with more job 
opportunities, higher potential wages, and higher earning partners) were the more likely 
to act ‘traditionally’ as ‘proper mothers’ - as conventionally understood in Britain - and 
leave the  worker role. It was mothers in lower income areas, such as those in former 
mining and heavy industry regions like north-east England or South Wales, who were 
more likely to act less traditionally in combining a worker role with motherhood. This is 
presumably because lower income mothers had less choice in exercising the ‘proper’ way 
of combining motherhood with paid work, and were forced to act ‘improperly’ for 
economic reasons. Rather than decreasing over time, this ‘motherhood employment 
effect’ seemed to have increased since 1991. 
 
This socio-spatial patterning of the motherhood employment effect shouldn’t have 
surprised us, because this fits in with previous ideas that Ros Edwards and myself 
developed about ‘gendered moral rationalities’ in our work on lone mothers and 
employment (Duncan and Edwards 1999). Mothers held different moral views, which 
were developed and maintained socially in particular settings, about how to properly 
combine motherhood with paid work. These then interact with the more economic 
considerations of what jobs and wages are available.  If circumstances permit, mothers 
will attempt to ‘properly’ mother as they see it. Higher household incomes –from male 
partners a well as their own employment – will enable them to better achieve this 
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‘proper’ outcome. For most mothers in our study, this meant withdrawing from the 
worker role, although some groups of mothers held alternative ideas of proper 
motherhood which involved a worker role. Most Black mothers we interviewed, for 
instance, held views which saw full-time employment as part of good mothering.  
 
A telling instance is what happens to the employment activity of lone mothers who re-
partner. We used Longitudinal Study data (which traces individuals between censuses) to 
examine this from 1981-91 (ibid). On average, such re-partnered mothers would have 
acquired greater household income, and also access to the new male partner for some 
extra childcare time; certainly their existing children would be older.  However, despite 
these greater resources and lower constraint levels, White mothers in the sample tended 
to leave existing paid work, especially full-time work, and move into part-time work and 
unemployment. In contrast, Black lone mothers tended to move from unemployment and 
part-time work into full-time work. Both ethnic groups of mothers used their increased 
resources to better support the (alternative) combination of motherhood and paid work 
they took to be morally correct. This process of using the economic resources available, 
to better promote what is socially seen as ‘proper mothering’, fits in with the geography 
in the 2006 study, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Note that acting ‘properly’ as a traditional mother does not only mean a focus on personal 
childcare; usually a traditional gendered division of labour at home is also included.  Not 
only this, but the recent development of an ‘equality illusion’, whereby choice and 
empowerment have been co-opted by the beauty and sex industries so that women can 
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‘choose’ to look and act as men desire (Banyard 2010, Walters 2010), has resulted in a 
new glorification of the perfect wife; the culture of domestic goddess in the kitchen and 
sexy partner on display –as well as ‘proper mother’ at home. This demands more time 
and work, for example, extra cooking, fitness classes, tanning sessions and so on. Full-
time employment becomes all the more difficult. Maybe this explains the intensification 
of the geographical pattern between 1991-2001. 
 
Decisions about the balance between paid employment and unpaid work are not 
‘economically rational’, but acted according to collective ideas of what is deemed 
socially proper, and this varies by social group and setting. Nor, as later work on 
partnered mothers employment and childcare decisions suggested, is there necessarily 
much reflection or negotiation about this. Rather there is often an acceptance, often a 
routinised or even an unconscious acceptance, of taken for granted ideas about what is 
natural and expected. For example, for many mothers it is seen as natural that men need 
the stimulation of paid work and are psychologically unsuited for childcare (Duncan et al 
2003, 2004). 
 
All this contradicts theoretical ideas about individualisation, reflexive modernity and the 
new democratic family, such as those advanced by Tony Giddens, Elizabeth Beck-
Gernsheim and Ulrich Beck. Rather, as mothers gain greater access to resources, and in 
principle gain more choice and more room for manoeuvre, then they are more likely to 
behave in accordance with what they experience as ‘traditional’ gender normatives. Nor 
do such behaviours seem to enhance any reflexive project of the self. Rather, they seem 
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to be structured by external social norms concerning obligations to others, and to be 
developed in the context of local conditions and particular social reference groups. This 
development can be habitual or even unconscious.  While there may be greater freedom 
for manoeuvre than before for many mothers, this does not automatically equate with 
individualisation.   Rather, if they can, mothers appear to ‘put family first’. 
Individualisation theorists confuse what people can potentially do (create individual self–
projects) with what they actually do (relate to others in more taken for granted 
‘traditional’ ways). 
 
We can find more examples of this in other areas of personal life like cohabitation, living 
apart together and different attitudes about family and relationships, which I explore 
below. For example, the seemingly inexorable rise of unmarried cohabitation is often 
portrayed as one key element of the ‘breakdown of the family’, or as representing the rise 
of ‘liquid love’. These commentators assume both lack of commitment and selfish 
individualism. Alternatively some individualisation theorists can see cohabitation as a 
trend index of the ‘pure relationship’, which leaves behind traditional ideas of romantic 
love and family commitment, and is instead based on purely consensual commitment in 
which partners stay together in so far as their autonomous self-development projects and 
erotic needs are met.  But contradicting both sets of assumptions, empirical evidence 
suggests that unmarried cohabitants are just as committed (or uncommitted) to their 
partner and children as married partners are, if we compare like with like controlling for 
age and income (Lewis 2001, Barlow et al. 2005). Most continue to adhere to traditional 
notions of marriage, love and commitment (ibid, Carter 2010). Not surprisingly, then, 
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cohabitants are just as traditional as married couples in everyday life, for example in 
sharing money and household tasks (Vogler 2005).  
 
Moreover, while some cohabitants consciously choose a principled alternative to 
marriage, most simply see cohabitation as similar to, and practically the same as, 
marriage in everyday life (cf Syltevik  2010 on Norway as ‘cohabitation land’). Most 
unmarried cohabitants are not at all opposed to marriage, but see this as an ideal (Duncan 
et al 2005). Indeed many cohabitants imagine themselves as marrying at some future time 
- although more accurately we should say ‘wedding’.  For most the wish is to enjoy an 
ornate white wedding (Carter 2010), which can publically – and traditionally - confirm 
their successful adult relationship and social position. In their eyes they are as good as 
married already given the ‘lived law’ of everyday life in everyday institutions like 
schools, workplaces or hospitals where cohabitation is equated with marriage. Hence it is 
not the marriage as a legal relationship which is pressing or desired, but the wedding. 
Consequently the ‘re-invention’ of the Victorian white wedding for cohabiting couples 
after the 1980s (1), in contrast to the simple, short and cheap weddings of most people in 
the 1940s and 50s, when legal marriage was socially necessary if a couple were to live 
together and have children. Tradition, in the form of the white wedding, is thereby 
idealised and used as a legitimating and positioning resource. A corollary of this is the 
‘marooning’ of ossified symbols of this tradition in new contexts (Charsley, 1992) - like 
the wedding cake.  The cake invokes tradition, where the rite of joint public cutting by 
bride and groom seems to represent the entrance of the couple into marriage as a different 
state.  At the same time, however, the wedding cake has been ‘re-invented’ with ornate 
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styles and embellishment showing personal difference (2). ‘Living Apart Together’ 
(LAT) is sometimes seen as going even further down this individualisation road as an 
alternative family form; in this view the partners can most easily have both intimacy and 
autonomy (Levin 2004). But the evidence suggests that LAT is usually not some 
conscious ‘alternative’ to coupledom, or a move ‘beyond the family’, but rather a more 
pragmatic response to circumstances with ‘traditional’ ideas about families, coupledom, 
and marriage as a continuing framework for behaviour (Duncan and Phillips 2010).   
 
What about earlier decades, for surely the way people behave in personal life has 
changed immensely since the supposedly ‘traditional’ 1950s? But, if we ‘standardise’ for 
the issues of the time, the way in which people make intimate decisions about personal 
life seem more or less the same as today. Here I draw on research comparing public ideas 
in Britain about family and intimate life for 1949/50 compared to 2006 (Duncan 2011) 
(3). For both 1949/50 and 2006, the married, older and religious were more ‘traditional’, 
and the young and professional were more ‘progressive’. Only a minority, in either the 
2006 or 1949/50 samples, acted according to some ‘progressive’ position. Similarly, only 
a few in either period appeared to subscribe to externally imposed ‘tradition’. Rather the 
bulk of both samples held pragmatic views of what was reasonably proper and possible in 
the circumstances of their time and place. Ideas about pre-marital sex in the 1949/50 give 
a good example. In principle, most respondents thought this was a bad thing; sex should 
take place within marriage.  But only a few thought such behaviour absolutely wrong, 
mostly the religious and particularly clergymen. Similarly, a few were particularly 
‘modern’ in seeing pre-marital sex as fine, even useful, as long as this was a 
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democratically arrived decision. Rather, most people pragmatically accepted that pre-
marital sex might well take place and would tolerate this lapse for ‘serious’ couples, who 
were in love but for some reason unable to marry just then.  Similar evidence is found in 
other historical family research (e.g. Smart 2007). The issues might have changed, but the 
contemporaneous distribution of modern, traditional, and pragmatic seem similar. 
 
In all these examples we find people usually making family decisions pragmatically, with 
reference to relationships, social norms, ‘lived law’, and the presumptions of particular 
social groups in different places.  Nor, it seems, were particular historical periods either 
hidebound by tradition or, alternatively, filled with self-reflexive individualisers. Rather, 
the examples suggest that people adapt to their circumstances through invoking and re-
inventing tradition, often habitually and unconsciously, and nearly always in interaction 
with other individuals and social groups, This is in some contrast to the assumptions 
made by individualisation and rationality theories. The question now is what do we do 
about this? Do we keep on heaping up empirical counter-evidence, or attempt some sort 
of alternative theorisation around ‘pragmatism’. I attempt to initiate the latter in the rest 
of this paper.  
 
3. Pragmatism as agency: from structuration to habitus 
What is this ‘pragmatism’ which is seemingly pervasive in everyday personal life?  
Pragmatism assumes some sort of power in making practical decisions and carrying out 
everyday tasks - in other words agency. As my examples above have shown, this is a 
qualified power exercised by agents in relation to others in social contexts.  
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Consequently, the idea of pragmatism takes us back to the idea of agency within 
constraint.  
 
Unfortunately social scientists often make assumptions about agency that are problematic 
in that individual motivations and actions become equated with purposive and conscious 
action (Cleaver 2002). Giddens is an influential example. In his ‘individualisation’ work 
(e.g. 1992), he has become increasingly optimistic about the possibilities for 
instrumental, empowering and reflexive individual agency to overcome constraints –
which in any case are supposedly withering away. Hence Giddens’ deduction of trends 
towards ‘pure relationships’ and ‘family democracy’, trends which empirical research has 
found so hard to locate (e.g. Jamieson 1998, Ahlberg et al 2008). At the other, 
pessimistic, extreme of individualisation theory Bauman nevertheless makes similar 
assumptions about agency; cultural codes and rules are increasingly loosing their grip and 
hence agents are now ‘abandoned to their own wits’ (2003, viii) even if this instead leads 
to ‘inevitable personal miseries’ (Smart 2007, 64). Family sociology is no exception to 
this overemphasis on purposive agency.  Famously Morgan (1996) redefined family 
studies away from family as a given institution, ‘a thing like object’ which remained 
outside its members’ influence, and towards family as a set of flexible practices and 
interactions – ‘family is what families do’. While this concept implies the importance of 
routinised and unconscious agency, in practice this has usually been interpreted as 
meaning what families consciously and purposively do. The recent emphasis on 
‘relationality’ in family studies (e.g. Mason 2004), although partly a reaction against 
individualisation theory, is an example.  While now seeing that people’s relationships 
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with others play a considerable part in their reasoning around personal decisions, this 
reasoning is still ‘intentional (and) thoughtful… which they actively sustain, maintain or 
allow to atrophy’ (Smart 2007, 48).  
 
Ironically, the earlier work of Giddens (e.g. 1984) can provide a corrective, where he 
conceives of three types of consciousness – discursive consciousness (where agents are 
able to bring actions and beliefs into discursive scrutiny), practical consciousness (taken 
for granted everyday practices that are so part of habit, routine and precedent that they are 
rarely scrutinised or reflected upon) and the unconscious (‘irrational’ thought and 
emotions like fear or desire).  The notion of agency in family studies has usually 
overemphasised discursive consciousness and underplayed the constitution of agency 
through the practical and the unconscious. This tendency is exacerbated by the dominant 
methodologies employed – the semi-structured interview and the survey questionnaire. 
Both methods largely assume discursive consciousness as decisive, and operate on this 
level.  But not all individual acts are the results of conscious strategy; many result from 
habit or routine, from the unconscious motivations of conscious actions and the 
unconscious self-disciplining of agents, and from the internalisation of hegemonic norms. 
Much of everyday practice – of pragmatism – will be non-reflexive, routine and 
structured. Mothers’ choices in combining employment and caring work is just one 
example (see figure 1). While we usually think of change as generated through purposive 
action, this implies that change can also result from routinised acts. Methodologically, 
this also implies techniques which better access the habitual and assumed – such as 
biographical interviews or observation. 
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So much for ‘choice’ – but what about ‘constraint’? For we should remember that while 
to be an agent is to make a difference and to exercise some sort of power; how much 
power and difference depends on relations with others through institutional structures 
(either formal and informal). It is these relations that allow, or restrict, an agent’s access 
to and use of resources. Some agents are better placed to deploy resources than others; 
indeed some may dominate social behaviour, while the access of others is limited. Again 
Giddens provides a useful guide in distinguishing between what he calls allocative 
resources (command over things, e.g. means of production) or authoritative resources 
(command over people – e.g. in organisations and institutions). Authoritative resources 
include moral world views – strongly gendered, socially stratified ideas about the proper 
behaviour and the rightful place of individuals with different social identities. So Ros 
Edwards and myself found that some mothers with a high level of human capital, and 
hence theoretically good opportunities for continuing their careers in taking highly paid 
work, in practice referred to particular gendered moral rationalities and social networks 
that precluded this and instead emphasised being an unemployed mother at home. Hence 
they did not pursue their relatively achievable career opportunities. Conversely, some 
mothers with low human capital – and hence from the discursive, rational economic point 
of view most likely to give up employment - in practice referred to alternative gendered 
moral rationalities and social networks that emphasised mothers’ full-time work, and 
hence they continued in long hours of employment (Duncan and Edwards, 1999). 
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‘Family’ agency is indeed relational, where the ‘power ‘ to act is shaped by social 
relations to others. However, this power is often routine and/or unconscious, rather than 
consciously purposeful. At the same time this relationality is not just with intimate others 
(although this may dominate people’s discursive agency) but with others in institutions, 
both formally and informally, and both individually and collectively.  As Mary Douglas 
(1987) famously put it, institutions ‘think’ on our behalf. In so doing social institutions 
(the accepted ways of thinking and doing) also constrain us, often invisibly. Cohabitants 
may discursively and intimately decide to live together through conscious feelings of 
partnership and commitment, but unconsciously and collectively act through ideas of 
romantic love and adult propriety maintained through the institution of marriage.  And 
the mortgage provider will treat them as married. So while individuals possess agency, 
this will be often prescribed or limited by the culture in which they find themselves, and 
by other agents. In this way structures shape the opportunities and resources available to 
individuals, hence their agency is not simply a matter of choice. Women’s choice 
between paid employment and unpaid caring work is not just a matter of lifestyle 
preferences as Catherine Hakim (2000) would have it - where she imagines no major 
constraints limiting or forcing choice in particular directions, and where individual 
preferences can be, and are, fully realized. In his laudatory introduction to Hakim, 
Giddens is even moved to claim that ‘we can no longer learn from history’, where 
‘individualisation has been the main driving force for change in late modern society’  
(Giddens 2000, vii). But nor are these choices simply a structural outcome of ‘patriarchy 
at work’ (Walby 1986). Agency operates somewhere in between. Re-enter, ironically 
enough, Giddens’ earlier concept of structuration. Re-enter also an old question – how far 
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can agency generate transformation, and how far it is subjected to the disciplines of social 
norms, sanctions, and the resources available? Think of those mothers in west London 
(see Fig 1).  
 
Structuration theory, while heuristically valuable, leads to an explanatory impasse.  How 
does this work in practice?  Researchers usually end up stressing either agency or 
structure, as the examples of Hakim and Walby cited above caricature.  Gross (2005) tries 
to square this circle by thinking of two types of structure. ‘Regulative traditions’ are 
those essentially external to the agent, with transgressions punished by communities or 
state authorities (e.g. living together unmarried in ‘traditional’ society). Alternatively 
‘meaning constitutive traditions’ operate internally to the agent, constituting her identity 
as cultural meanings are passed down between generations. An example is when 
cohabitants continue to act with reference to ideals around marriage. This distinction also 
allows Gross to have his individualisation cake and eat it – unlike Giddens, he does not 
have to entirely retreat from structure. Individualisation, understood as 
‘detraditionalisation’, does indeed occur as regulative traditions decline, but because of 
the continuing strength of meaning-constitutive tradition this does not mean ‘unbounded 
agency and creativity’ (ibid, 288). There is not, contra Giddens in his ‘individualisation’ 
work, a simple polarity between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ society, still less traditional 
and modern people. We are still subject to ‘sedimented habituality’ and ‘intersubjectively 
shared traditions’ (Gross, 2005, 293), so that many everyday actions are not that different 
to those in the past. So now people can live together unmarried, as community and state 
regulative tradition weakens in ‘modern’ societies, However, marriage will remain a 
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social ideal and model for action – even for the unmarried - given that agents’ actions 
continue to be shaped by the meaning constitutive traditions of romantic love and couple 
commitment. In this way Gross can retain individualisation theory but also encompass its 
empirical critiques (see also Smart 2007 who employs Gross in this way).  
 
Gross makes a useful observation in signalling the importance of routinised and habitual 
practices, and in debunking the ‘traditional /modern’ polarity. But to my mind his central 
analytical device does not work; it re-introduces another polarity.  Indeed, Gross himself 
admits that the distinction between the regulative and meaning-constitutive traditions is 
‘always blurry in concrete empirical cases’ (op cit, 296). For example, the cultural 
tradition of romantic love can invoke considerable regulative activity, while marriage as a 
regulative institution has hardly lost its cultural leverage. Both sorts of tradition (as 
distinguished analytically) are equally subject to structuration. The structuration riddle 
has not gone away through the device of ‘analytically’ separating two sorts of structure. 
Rather it is the earlier Giddens (1984) who gives the better lead in his idea of ‘praxis’- 
agency originates in the individual’s skilful performance of everyday life and the creative 
use of the resources available.  But it is Bourdieu who has gone furthest in resolving this 
structuration problem, or at least inspired most acclaim – ‘habitus’ is the answer. 
 
Bourdieu starts from the basic observation that even in our most conscious and reflective 
thoughts we cannot but take some things for granted. As Francois Collett (2009) points 
out, this would have the appearance of a truism, except that it goes against the tenets of 
much of social science with its underpinnings of rationality – individualisation is perhaps 
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the latest sociological example (Duncan et al 2003). It is ‘nonsensical’ to imagine that 
any action can be fully “reflexive” in the sense of a complete break with all prior 
traditions and habits (Gross 2005). Hence, a corrective is found in Bourdieu’s idea of 
‘habitus’: 
‘lasting dispositions or trained capacities and structural propensities to think, feel, 
act in determinate ways, which then guide [agents] in their creative responses to 
the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu’ (Wacquant 2005, 316).    
People follow rules without referring to them; their view of the world and their actions 
are framed by their past experience and current social position, and so they develop by 
necessity a practical sense of orientation that guides them in their actions. The taken for 
granted character of this does not call for examination by the agents themselves because 
the choices produced by this practical sense seem self-evident, beyond questioning. 
Agents might even consider as normal or fair situations that may seem unfair or 
unbearable to external observers.  Note however, that this habitual and unconscious 
component does not mean that agents necessarily reproduce past behaviour, for they must 
take into account changes in the social fields in which they are situated. As Collett (2009) 
observes, this is a justification for using the term ‘habitus’ rather than just simply 
‘habits’; agents cannot simply be reduced to the rules. Hence agents both follow rules and 
exercise agency; they combine discursive, practical and unconscious agency.  
 
The notion of ‘gendered moral rationalities’ can, with hindsight, be seen in this way 
(Duncan and Edwards 1999, Duncan et al 2003) (4). Mothers develop employment – 
caring combinations with reference to taken for granted ideas about proper behaviour as a 
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mother, ideas which are produced and maintained in particular social and spatial contexts. 
But as the example shows, these particular agents did not simply or necessarily reproduce 
past behaviour (of their own mothers, for instance), because they had to take into account 
changing circumstances – in this case the changing structural landscapes of labour 
markets, social infrastructure and social policies. For example some mothers needed 
employment for longer hours than their ideal suggested, and they extended the ideas of 
‘good mothering’ – or at least ‘good enough mothering’ to the supposedly one to one 
emotional support that childminders might extend to their children as some sort of 
replacement mother (Duncan et al 2004). This re-adaption of habitus reminds us of 
Bourdieu’s maxim (eg Bourdieu 1977) that everyday life involves  ‘necessary 
improvisation’.   
 
Habitus takes us further, then, in tackling the structuration problem, of allowing agents 
both creativity and habituation.  Frustratingly, the problem of process remains – just how 
does habitus work, how do agents both follow rules and exercise agency? How, then, 
does the necessary improvisation of everyday life actually proceed? Hence, in mirror 
image, the particular problem in attempting to explain how mothers’ gendered moral 
rationalities worked.   
 
A first attempt was to follow agents’ biographical and relational histories in detail 
(Duncan 2005). For example why did Christina (one of the interviewees) stay in badly 
paid, semi-casual employment, despite her aspirations for something better, her strongly 
held belief that mothers needed an ‘outside life’, and evidence of considerable application 
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and ability in combining employment with caring tasks across the generations?  Why did 
she keep having ‘unplanned’ children as soon as her position allowed some possibility of 
career improvement? Interview analysis suggested both a strong identification with her 
parents’ ‘traditional’ understandings of family, but simultaneously combined with 
antipathy to her own early family experience as an only child, buttressed by her 
husband’s traditional view of gender roles.  All this seemed to cement her identity as stay 
at home mother with new babies. Hence she could not actualise her own career ambitions 
and in this way culturally reproduced her disadvantaged class and gender position. In 
contrast, while Carrie shared Christina’s ‘primarily mother’ gendered moral rationality, 
she nonetheless held down a demanding full-time job as head teacher. Her moral 
understandings that good mothers stayed at home stemmed, it seemed, from identification 
with her own mother’s cultural understandings. But at the same time she was able to 
pursue a full-time employment career because her partner, Pete, acted and had identified 
as full-time ‘mother-substitute’. In turn, this followed his earlier immersion in the culture 
of a feminist commune, shared with Carrie, and now buttressed by her (and his) 
continuing feminist politics. 
 
These sorts of story can be fascinating, but essentially this approach results in an 
explanatory dead end. This is because it ends up with a mass of individual explanations 
of particular stories; the only overall explanation possible is a type of aggregate 
generalisation. Typically, this would stress factors like the mothers’ (non)identification 
with their own parents, the biographical development of their social identity, and the 
power relations amongst the contemporary parents (ibid). The psycho-social approach 
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takes this immersion in personal detail even further, and at first sight does appear to reach 
those parts that other theories cannot. This is not just because of its close accounting of 
how individual situations develop, but because it refers to psychoanalytic ideas about 
causal process in doing so (e.g. unconscious identification or attachment). Respondents’ 
stories are first elicited, and then interpreted to reveal what lies behind them. Working 
with and reworking an individual’s social and psychic development – their personal and 
relational ‘tradition’ - is central to this process. In this way an explanatory generalisation 
seems more possible, as well as the collection of empirical detail. Together with the use 
of more in-depth, and more open, interview techniques (often the BNIM method, 
Wengraf 2001), this explains some current popularity in research on family and intimate 
lives (e.g. Roseneil 2006, 2009). But several difficulties emerge.  First, the approach 
exacerbates the problem of creating a mass of specific detail on particular cases. Second, 
social relations in collectivities and institutions are neglected. It is the agent’s 
unconscious which is prioritised over both practical and discursive consciousness. Useful 
though the psycho-social approach is in recognising the unconscious and non-discursive 
(and hence also providing a complimentary critique of individualisation theories), in my 
view it over-emphasises the individual’s ‘interior’ agency and personal ‘tradition’, and 
hence restates the structuration problem in a different guise. 
 
So far, something of an impasse. We still need a means of operationalising Giddens’ 
‘praxis’ and Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘necessary improvisation’ of everyday life.  I think 
the notion of ‘bricolage’ can perform this function as a ‘middle range’ theorisation of 
how agency is socially institutionalised and practised.  Ironically enough, Marx implied a 
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similar resolution in his well known illustration of the ‘structure -agency’ problem in 
1852, in his commentary on Louis Bonapatre’s coup of the ‘18th Brumaire’. First, in an 
oft quoted passage, he delineates the structuration problem: 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.’ (Marx, 1934, 10)  
But in the very next sentence Marx observes how a process of bricolage, the improvised 
adaption from earlier practice and understandings, gave agents a means to act: 
‘And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, 
creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to 
present this new scene in world history in time-honoured disguise and borrowed 
language’  (ibid).  
 
4. Bricolage as understanding pragmatism  
4.1 From ‘intellectual bricolage’ to bricolage as institutionalised agency 
Travelling around France you come across large shed retail outlets offering ‘bricolage’; 
these are Do-It-Yourself (DIY) stores. Bricoleurs, the people who go to these outlets and 
do the jobs, might be translated as ‘handymen’, or even ‘bodgers’. But in fact this real 
life metaphor is apt, bricolage in theory concerns the everyday practice of DIY and 
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muddling through – but socially and collectively at large, rather than just individually for 
home improvements 
 
The social science appropriation of the term seems to have started with Lévi-Strauss, and 
has been taken up extensively as a metaphor in the visual arts and architecture  (where 
DIY is both practical and theoretical) and hence in cultural studies. Bricolage as an 
explanatory device has also been used in research on management and entrepreneurship, 
and on information systems. This is because of the inadequacies of dominant business 
and information theories that focus on the rationality and irrationality of choice and 
resource allocation. Rather, empirically, managers and entrepreneurs are found to 
‘invent’ resources from available materials, to make do with what is to hand, and so 
create something from ‘nothing’. Similarly policy is not derived from a ‘rational’ 
evaluation of evidence; rather policy makers piece together, assemble and make sense of 
various sources and types of information, often second hand, to create something new.  
Here, however, I raid Frances Cleaver’s (2002, 2011) formulation of ‘institutional 
bricolage’ in development studies. In this formulation there is a particular focus on social 
institutions in carrying through social and economic development, and it presents 
therefore a more sociological use of bricolage. 
 
Cleaver starts from Mary Douglas’ extension of Levi-Strauss’s concept of ‘intellectual 
bricolage’ to institutional theory, in contradiction to theories of rational choice and action 
(Douglas 1973, 1987). ‘Institutions do the thinking’ on behalf of people, and these 
institutions are constructed through a process of bricolage – the gathering and applying of 
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analogies and styles of thought that are already part of existing institutions. Social 
formulae are repeatedly used in the construction of institutions, thereby economising on 
cognitive (and social) energy by offering easier classification and legitimacy. This also 
implies ‘institutional leakage’ whereby ‘Sets of rules are metaphorically connected with 
one another, and allow meaning to leak from one context to another along the formal 
similarities that they show’ (Douglas 1973:13). This is a sort of institutional DIY rather 
than the more explicitly conscious and rational form of institutional engineering or design 
so often assumed.  
 
Douglas emphasises the sameness and constraint of this form of institutional 
development, thus ‘the bricoleur uses everything there is to make transformations within 
a stock repertoire of furnishings’ (Cleaver 2002, 66). Cleaver departs from Douglas in 
emphasising agency as critical in shaping and reshaping institutions.  People consciously 
and unconsciously draw on existing social and cultural arrangements - existing 
institutions, styles of thinking, social norms and sanctioned social relationships - to 
‘patch’ or ‘piece together' institutions in response to changing situations. These 
institutions are therefore neither completely new, nor completely traditional, but rather a 
dynamic mixture of the 'modern' and 'traditional', and the 'formal' and 'informal'. At the 
same time, different bricoleurs apply knowledge, power and resources in different ways, 
and there is variability in the capacity of individuals to act as bricoleurs.  Some agents 
have much less capacity to act in the resultant structure than others – although all retain 
the potential to act. In this way there is a differential moulding of institutions by 
bricoleurs, and of bricoleurs by institutions. Cleaver coins the term ‘institutional 
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bricolage’ to describe these processes, and goes on to demonstrate them empirically in 
case studies of resource use, water supply, and livelihoods (Cleaver 2011). 
 
Individualisation theorists also pick up on the ‘DIY’ analogy for social action.  But they 
do so in a completely different way, which emphasises individual and discursive agency 
in an open social world divorced from tradition. Thus Beck and Beck-Gernshein assert 
that ‘normal’ biographies of love are being replaced by ‘do-it-yourself biographies’. But 
for them:  
‘biographies are removed from the traditional precepts and certainties, from 
external control and general moral laws, becoming open and dependent on 
decision-making, and are assigned as a task for each individual’ (2002, 5; see 
Gross 2005).  
Giddens takes this even further, for him ‘the past is not preserved but continuously 
reconstructed on the basis of the present’ (Giddens 1994, 63).  The hallmark of tradition, 
then, is the amount of energy devoted to such a project – and this implies a large 
expenditure of social time and labour. Clearly, these metaphors are quite different from 
Cleaver’s more developed and operational use of bricolage.  For her bricolage is deeply 
social, often hidden and non-reflexive, usually unequal, and the past is ‘re-served’ 
through its improvised adaption in the search for a low expenditure of social energy. This 
development of ‘institutional bricolage’ appears to fit much better than 
‘Individualisation’ with the empirical examples of ‘pragmatism’ discussed in section 2. 
 
 
4.2 How bricolage works 
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How then, does institutional bricolage work in practice?  Drawing on Cleaver and others 
using her work (e.g. de Koning 2010), we can draw out a list of principles emerging from 
the empirical work on development. 
 
An underlying tenet is that people are highly likely, when acting either consciously or 
unconsciously in responding to new circumstances, to reduce both their own cognitive 
effort and the social energy involved in negotiating with or otherwise relating to others. 
This is for two main reasons. First, it takes some effort, in terms of time and social effort, 
to develop and maintain adaptive practices; completely new institutions take most effort 
of all to set up and run, and correspondingly the probability of a successful outcome will 
be less. Secondly, our own cognitive and social capacities are limited (cf Martin 2010). 
The obvious way of both minimising cognitive and social energy, and enhancing the 
probability of success, is to draw on and adapt from well-known norms, customs and 
practices. People can go along with the new arrangements without having to cognitively 
calculate and socially negotiate every single interaction. This can hardly be a rational and 
reflexively discursive practice. As John Martin (2010) engagingly puts it, we should 
better view ‘culture’ as a vast junkyard into which we foray from time to time in the 
attempt to find something useful, where most is left unused and unshared, and where 
what is used is selective, simplified, even idiosyncratic.  Note however, that this 
‘traditional’ resolution might not be the most socially efficient in the long term; people 
still have to work at using the adaption which, given its patchy compromises, may well 
be sub-optimal in a ‘rational’ sense.  
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This process of conserving social energy links in with a principle of social legitimation.  
People need existing reference points to make sense of their adaptive behaviours, both to 
themselves and to others.  It is far easier if what they are doing is generally accepted as a 
‘right’ and  ‘sensible’ way of doing things, even better if the new adaption appears 
‘legitimate’ or even ‘natural’. Bricolage, then, can become part of the  ‘naturalisation’ of 
social life.  The example discussed above of seeing unmarried cohabitation as ‘DIY’ 
marriage is a case in point; in this case it is easier to rest new behaviour – openly living 
together unmarried - upon pre-existing and accepted institutions like marriage, and pre-
existing norms like romantic couple love and the nuclear family. Think of the travails of 
various ‘new age’ communes, which self-consciously attempted to replace all of these.  
 
For the communards conventional families were failures, excessively closed and rigid, 
instead they would create family life based on openness and non-possessive attachments. 
But their communes were hard to maintain, both because of a lack of social legitimacy as 
well as the vast amounts of social energy consumed in running them. For example, 
McCulloch’s 1970s study found only 5 out of 67 communes survived 5 years (McCulloch 
1982).  The amount of relationship work was too great, communication was too difficult, 
and excessive bureaucracy choked everyday life. In addition, large amounts of capital and 
emotional investment were required, and this is one reason why class and gender 
inequalities were reproduced.  Indicatively, communes with a religious basis – that is 
with pre-existing traditions – were the most likely to survive. Nor were communes able to 
reproduce intergenerationally and the status of children was deeply problematic. Tim 
Guest’s (2004) childhood autobiography of his early life in various Osho movement 
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communes, which among other things involved living with ‘200 mothers’ – but little 
contact with his biological mother - has been described as a ‘rightly disturbing read of 
malignant child neglect by people who sought a heaven, but made a hell’ (Kirkus review, 
15.11.2004). In contrast ’problem families’ are seen as an issue about dysfunctional 
people as they fail to live up to the assumed natural ideal of the nuclear family, not a 
problem of the institution itself or its setting in disadvantaged circumstances. The 
‘heaven’ of family is already there, it is just that particular people are inadequate to enter 
it.  
 
In this way tradition is idealised, and is used as a legitimating and positioning resource. 
However, in practice ‘tradition’ is often re-invented or reformed as people adapt and 
improvise. This is a form of bricolage in itself. Think of the re-invention of the white 
wedding, discussed earlier.  The cultural display of a wedding, and the multiple 
performances that constitute it (as brides, grooms, flower girls, bride’s father, guests, etc) 
are not just seen as meaningful by participants, who see the show as necessary for 
publically conveying the meaning of marriage and commitment (Carter 2010). This 
meaning also requires the ‘symbolic aerosol’ of tradition to cement its legitimation. I 
once attended an ‘alternative’ druid wedding, complete with performances from pagan 
priests from east, west, south and north. Even the alternative needs tradition. Similarly, I 
recently stayed in a Provencal hill village almost entirely populated by Belgian and 
British ex-pats. Nonetheless, the new village life still needed organisation (how to 
arrange yoga classes for example), and the easiest way seemed to be a re-enacting of pre-
existing peasant feasts at important markers in the now defunct agricultural calendar. As 
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Giddens wrote in 1984 (ironically given his later individualisation work), institutions so 
derived survive partly due to the moral command of what went before over the present.  
 
This re-use and re-invention of tradition can lead to ‘institutional leakage’, as Douglas 
(1973) put it.  Through adaption, meaning leaks from the older forms into new ones. 
Marriage, unmarried cohabitation, and living apart together (LAT) all are quite different 
legally; similarly, all contain within them the potential for quite different versions of 
intimacy and are sometimes experienced as such. However, in practice, people’s lived 
lives are usually quite similar within all three couple forms (Barlow et al 2005, Duncan 
and Phillips 2008). This is because intimacy within them is partly maintained, 
rationalised and legitimated by ideas of romantic love and commitment ‘leaking’ from 
pre-existing ideas surrounding ‘traditional’ marriage. This is an empirical case of 
theorists confusing what agents can potentially do with what they actually do. In this way 
the so often theorised duality between traditional and (post/late) modern is misleading. 
Which is traditional (marriage?), which is modern (cohabitation / LAT)? The answer is 
neither, both are in–between as supposedly ‘traditional’ meanings leak into supposedly 
‘modern’ practices. This leakage can be a two way process. Hence the supposed golden 
standard of marriage, when examined closely in terms of what partners do and expect, 
resembles a form of cohabitation in legal dressing (Lewis 2001). In this way Giddens was 
half correct in his 1994 assertion that ‘the past is not preserved but continuously 
reconstructed on the basis of the present’ (op cit, 63); the other half is however his 1984 
observation that tradition survives through its moral claims over the present. 
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A key to bricolage is social legitimation. Not anything and everything goes. For bricolage 
is not just about adapting from existing practices to create something new, but about 
successful institutionalisation and social reproduction of this new practice over time. This 
means acceptance and validation by other people, not just individually but collectively. 
Successful bricolage will thereby involve negotiation and contestation. The assembly of 
parts and the adaption of tradition for a new purpose implies a conscious scrutiny of some 
tradition, of beliefs, norms, values and arrangements. People can be discursively critical 
of some parts of tradition even as they unconsciously accept others. So although claim on 
tradition is a legitimating device, tradition is not necessarily sacrosanct, nor automatically 
accepted by all actors. Weeks et al. (2001) on same-sex intimacies and the emergence of 
‘families of choice’ give a good example. The research respondents actively created 
‘chosen’ families, based around friendship rather than kin, partly as a means to confirm 
an alternative identity and a new way of belonging; in this way they discursively 
interrogated tradition and saw themselves as trying to do something different from 
conventional families. But at the same time, less critically and less consciously, they also 
sought legitimacy for these new arrangements through linking them with existing, 
traditional family images – all the more useful in this way because of their widespread, 
and generally uncritical, acceptance as entirely positive. Civil Partnership in Britain, 
through which same sex couples can legally register in quasi-marriage, epitomises this 
nexus of ‘traditional and modern’, and the combination of critical scrutiny with 
unconscious acceptance.  
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For Civil Partnership, while recognising and legitimating partnerships with alternative 
sexualities, almost totally reproduces the standard heterosexual marriage legally, 
ceremonially and symbolically. Hence the worry expressed by some that civil partnership 
institutionally de-radicalises and co-opts gay men and lesbians into heteronormative 
models of coupledom; they will be less inclined, and less able, to forge new and more 
progressive ways of developing relationships outside the traditional family. On the other 
hand, civil partners are now able to use their new legal status to ‘naturalise’ their love, 
care and commitment (Shipman and Smart 2007). Indeed, sometimes things are changed, 
at the discursive level, so that other things - left unremarked and accepted unconsciously 
- can remain the same (Crow 2008). Changes to divorce law, and the normalisation of 
divorce and separation, are good examples, for arguably these changes have allowed the 
‘traditional’ institutions of marriage and weddings to survive. This combination of 
simultaneously questioning and using tradition will be socially uneven and will produce 
contestation and negotiation both within families and within institutions, as these 
examples show (see also Wilson 2007).  At the same time bricoleurs are unequal in their 
resources, capacities, and institutional locations. As discussed earlier, some agents will be 
better able to develop new practices than others. By the same token some bricoleurs will 
be more able to influence the outcome, in terms of social acceptance, then others. The 
adapted development of practices will be all the more uneven. Not all potential bricolage 
is either possible or successful. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Individualisation theories misrepresent and romanticise agency as a primarily discursive 
and reflexive process where people freely create their personal lives in an open social 
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world divorced from tradition. There may be constraints of various sorts on action, but 
these are external to an unbounded agency. But empirically we find that people usually 
make decisions about their personal lives pragmatically, bounded by and in connection 
with other people, not only relationally but also institutionally. This pragmatism is often 
non-reflexive, habitual and routinised, even unconscious. Agents consciously and 
unconsciously draw on existing traditions  - styles of thinking, sanctioned social 
relationships, institutions, the presumptions of particular social groups and places, lived 
law and social norms - to ‘patch’ or ‘piece together' responses to changing situations. 
Often it is institutions that ‘do the thinking’.  People try to both conserve social energy 
and seek social legitimation in this adaption process, a process which can lead to a ‘re-
serving’ of tradition even as institutional leakage transfers meanings from past to present, 
and vice versa. But this will always be socially contested and socially uneven. This 
process of bricolage is a basic reason for the lack of congruence between the way 
individualisation theory depicts contemporary personal life and people’s lives as 
represented in empirical studies. 
 
This version of bricolage defines how people actually link structure and agency through 
their actions.  It can provide a framework for empirical research in giving a range of 
operational questions to pursue. Rather than seeking for modern, individualising or 
traditional behaviour, we can instead ask how people adapt and re-serve tradition in 
reacting to new circumstances, how this may - or may not - secure legitimation, how 
meanings leak from older to newer traditions and, not least, in what ways these processes 
and their outcomes are socially uneven and unequal. In this way bricolage can provide a 
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perspective for developing those current theorisations of family and personal life which 
are more in tune with contemporaneous empirical studies than individualisation theory. 
The ideas of ‘doing’ family practices, located in wider systems of meaning, and 
articulated through moral rationalities, relationality and ‘proper’ display (see James and 
Curtis 2010, Smart 2011 for recent accounts), empirically echo a wider bricolage 
perspective. For the common thread that runs through them is the idea of people doing 
family as they act pragmatically within their circumstances This echo also alerts us, 
however, to a relative neglect of the institutional and the unequal in this tradition of 
family studies (cf Heaphy 2012). Put together, this set of mid range theory confronts 
individualisation theory as an alternative theorisation of family and personal life. My 
argument here is that bricolage can provide an organising perspective. 
 
 
Notes 
1. The ‘white wedding’ first appeared among elite groups in the mid 19th century, 
supposedly after Queen Victoria chose white for her wedding to Prince Albert in 1840.  
Before this, wedding gowns were typically red or brown, even black. Etiquette books 
then began to turn the white gown into a tradition, and it became a symbol of status that 
also carried a connotation of innocence and sexual purity. Nonetheless, white weddings 
did not become common in the middle classes until the 1950s, and it was the 1980s that 
saw their final pervasiveness; ironically in view of the increasing likelihood of pre-
marital sex and cohabitation. 
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2. The classic wedding cake of a multi-tiered, rich and iced fruitcake seems to have 
emerged, like the white wedding with which it was intimately connected, in the late 19
th
 
century (following the example set by one of Queen Victoria’s daughters in 1859). 
Earlier traditions used decorated loaves or oatcakes. It became especially popular in 
English speaking countries by the early 20
th
 century, and has been especially tenacious in 
Britain where the rite of joint public cutting by bride and groom seems to represent the 
entrance of the couple into marriage as a different state.  
 
3. Data were taken from British Social Attitudes 2006, Mass Observation’s ‘Little 
Kinsey’ 1949 report, and Geoffrey Gorer’s 1950 survey. See Duncan 2011 for details. 
 
4. We presumably used the term ‘rationality’ because of the dominance of conventional 
economic explanations in the field at that time, either explicitly or implicitly (as in much 
of social policy); see Duncan and Edwards 1999, ch. 8. 
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